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Hazards of Solid Waste Management:
Bioethical Problems, Principles, and
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by Margaret N. Maxey*
The putative hazards of solid waste management cannot be evaluated without placing the problem
within a cultural climate ofcrisis where some persons consider such by-products of "high, hard technol-
ogy" to have raised unresolved moral and ethical issues. In order to assist scientific and technical efforts
to protect public health and safety, a bloethical perspective requires us to examine three controversial
aspects ofpolicy-making about public safety. Failure to recognize the qualitative difference between two
cognitive activities-risk-measurements (objective, scientific probabilities) and safety-judgments (subjec-
tive, shifting value priorities)-has had three unfortunate consequences. Sophisticated methods of risk
analysis have been applied in a piecemeal, haphazard, ad hoc fashion within traditional institutions with
the false expectation that incremental risk-reducing programs automatically ensure public health and
safety. Ethical priorities require, first and foremost, a whole new field of data arranged for comparable
risk-analyses. Critics of cost/risk/benefit quantifications attack the absurdity of "putting a price on
human life" but have not been confronted with its threefold ethical justification. The widening discrep-
ancy in risk-perceptions and lossofmutual confidence between scientific experts and ordinary citizens has
placed a burden ofsocial responsibility on members ofthe scientific and technical community to engage in
more effective public education through the political process, notwithstanding advocates ofa nonscientific
adversary process. The urgency of effective public education has been demonstrated by the extent to
which we have lost our historically balancedjudgment about the alleged environmental hazards posed by
advanced technology.
Underlying the theme of this symposium is a
bifurcated assumption. Hazardous solid wastes de-
rived from a number oftechnology-induced sources
not only exist in significant volumes in our envi-
ronment, but also constitute a potential biohazard
to the extent that past and proposed disposal op-
tions are not technologically "sound" and/or they
entail risks ofuncertain public acceptability. What-
ever the technical facts of the matter may be, the
shadowy specter of increasing increments to en-
vironmental degradation, plus diminished protec-
tion of public health and safety, appear to raise
moral and ethical issues of some importance. It re-
mains to be seen whether these problems are
"shadow" or "substance."
By way of introduction, I should make clear that
the bioethical perspective adopted throughout my
reflections on this subject represents a departure
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from that which is considered "mainstream" and
"'accepted" among current specialists in the area of
bioethics. In their view, the major problems with
which bioethics should be concerned are these: ge-
netic engineering, human experimentation, death
and dying, abortion, behavior modification, alloca-
tion of scarce medical resources, and the like. It is
my view, however, that such problems have for
years been regarded as belonging to the realm of
biomedical ethics which is actually a species of
professional ethics. By contrast, it should be the
task ofbioethics to address itselfto a relatively new
set of problems arising from, and gravitating
around, human efforts to enhance and exert control
overthe quality oflife ofthe biosphere-considered
as a total system of conditions which sustain and
protect the health and safety of living organisms,
primarily and principally human beings.
To address a recently recognized set of problems
as yet poorly attended to, bioethics must perforce
adopt a multidisciplinary approach. It needs a more
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those problems more adequately than heretofore,
devise a more wholistic or "'total-system" perspec-
tive, and propose more fitting public policies and
social structures for coping with them. We do not
lack ethical norms and values. Indeed, we have
more than we know how to implement in any co-
herent, consistent, cohesive manner where public
policy is at stake. What we urgently need is a proper
perspective and greater insight in formulating the
problems about our common humanity under pres-
ent global conditions and in a cultural climate of
crisis.
As public debate about "high technology" has
become increasingly polarized and politicized, pub-
lic leaders in the environmentalist movement, po-
litical activists, religious groups, and certain gov-
ernment officials tell us that our "unsafe, unforgiv-
ing, alienating, centralized hard technologies" raise
key issues which are not technical or economic or
scientific, but "moral and ethical." They go on to
assert that experts in high technology are profes-
sionally unqualified for making ethical or moral
judgments, because they can only make technical
assessments or economic cost/benefit analyses.
Moreover, even if experts were qualified, their
moraljudgments would be tainted, self-serving, and
clouded by motives of profit and avarice. Experts
are accused, by implication, ofvaluing their careers
over human lives. Only persons who are scientifi-
cally illiterate and technically ill-informed can be
trusted to raise moral and ethical issues for public
debate. It would appear that expertise in scientific
and technological matters is a corrupting influence
on the purity of moral judgments.
Obviously the impediments to formulating ethical
problems in accord with such reasoning are multiple
and profound, but one fact of life is becoming in-
creasingly clearer: ours is a new ethical situation.
Heretofore, ethicists have assumed that the effec-
tive range ofconsequences ofhuman action-hence
human responsibility-was confined to the here and
now, to known and intended effects, to defining
"the human good" as an imperative to be expressed
in the moral quality of "'neighbor values"-justice,
truthtelling, freedom, respect for human rights, etc.
So conceived, ethics is anthropocentric, with the
nonhuman world of Nature serving as a backdrop,
an ethically neutral instrument subject to human
purposes. But science, technology, and a popula-
tion explosion have drastically changed the causal
scale of human activities, as well as our integration
within nature's delicate web. As a consequence,
traditional "'neighbor" ethics has become increas-
ingly problematic, because it is too individualistic,
too shortsighted and piecemeal in its definition of
problems, goals, and moral values. When con-
fronted with seemingly awesome changes in the
range and power with which human actions have
global effects continuing into future generations, a
traditional "'neighbor" ethic is simply inadequate to
the task ofdefining criteriaforeffecting "the human
good." To formulate the problems which reflect a
new ethical situation, our perspective must be en-
larged, not only with a more comprehensive time
horizon, but also with a capacity to acquire and
disseminate an unprecedented degree of accurate,
scientific, technical knowledge which is both pres-
ently verifiable and predictive.
This situation is complicated further by a curious
social paradox: as public attention to complex so-
cial issues mounts upward, public understanding
gyrates downward under the burden ofcomplexity.
Confidence in our social institutions has undergone
a dramatic decline; fears and fantasies have all but
obliterated public recognition of reasonable argu-
ments. As in previous times of deep historical
change, we are now experiencing an irruption of
superstition, a withdrawal into mysticism, a surge
of emotionalism and irrational fascination with dis-
aster movies and dramas about demonic posses-
sion. Many persons express a desire for a simpler
life, a return to a low-consumption and low-energy
society. This desire becomes linked with an anti-
technological attitude, a mounting distrust of per-
sons engaged in applying advanced technologies
within a society. An "'anti-expert" emotion leads to
the credibility problem: "'The experts cannot be
trusted" because they have a stake in the outcome
of scientific research or technological success. It is
not to be wondered at that public debates over the
potential hazards and risks of recombinant DNA
research, genetic engineering, birth and death con-
trol, as well as centralized industrial technologies
have become natural outlets for ventilating many
irrational needs at this juncture in human history.
It is essential to recognize this state ofaffairs as a
precondition for doing any sort ofjustice to public
concern over alleged biohazards associated with
solid waste management. We may be persuaded
that ours is a rational scientific age where blind be-
liefs, prejudices, and presuppositions can be ex-
posed, if not dispelled under the purifying light of
objective facts. But the record ofevents in this dec-
ade alone should convince us that the mesh of the
net which filters "'the facts" is still being woven by
psychic forces which succumb to fateful deter-
minism, to superstitious fascination with the De-
monic, with personified powers of Evil lurking at
the edges ofsocial reality. Facts are held hostage by
perception.
Using that skeleton key, an ethicist considering
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or later discern that the issues being raised are
clustered into at least three distinct levels. The
clustering correlates with a capacity to perceive,
analyze, and weigh a spectrum of risks. So far, the
most prominent "moral issues" have clearly
emerged from a horizon of perception fixated at its
narrowest focus. They are dictated by a personal
risk-aversion, with only marginal consideration, if
any, of greater social risks and costs that are at
stake. A few issues have been raised by those
whose perception has recognized the inescapable
connection between risks and benefits which must
be weighed and balanced so as to determine the
acceptability of perceived risks. Still fewer issues
have emerged from a perception that certain risks
must be accepted when compared or contrasted
with other greater risks which are much less accept-
able.
A fundamental ethical premise emerges: ifethical
issues are to be adequately raised and debated pub-
licly, then they must be based not upon risk-
aversion, nor simply upon cost/risk/benefit
analyses, but more comprehensively, on compar-
able-hazard and risk/risk assessments. It is ethically
irresponsible and unjustifiable to foreclose public
consideration of deeper ethical reflections by mak-
ing moralistic a priorijudgments. Two examples are
currently prominent. "Since plutonium is the most
toxic substance in the world and can be made into
weapons, it is intrinsically evil." Or, "'Making
safety-policy decisions based on assigning finite,
monetary values to human lives is immoral."
It is not my purpose here to debate, much less
resolve, complex theoretical disputes about which
issues are legitimately ethical or moral. My task is a
more modest one, namely to bring the perspective
of bioethics to bear on one fundamental question:
what ethical principles and priorities might serve to
clarify the difficult task of utilizing sophisticated
risk-analyses, ofeducating public perceptions about
risks that seemingly diminish "safety," and of
maintaining social realism as we consider the case
before us.
This bioethical perspective on the putative risks
entailed by managing hazardous solid wastes begins
with some commonsense assumptions. In the first
place, I presume that the term "wastes" is being
applied with a modicum of technical precision as
well as respect for ordinary usage. In the interest of
definitional clarity, the term should denote anything
which is unproductive or has exhausted its value or
is without immediate or foreseeable utility for ful-
filling human needs. The origins, locations, and
volume of hazardous solid wastes are matters of
fact. Presumably, it is a matter of scientifically es-
tablished fact that adverse health effects, somatic or
genetic, may result from exposure to certain kinds
of solid wastes under conditions where the dose is
in excess ofcertain levels oftolerance. It remains a
matter of value judgment, however, that certain
types of wastes ought to be considered a potential
source ofunacceptable risks to the environment and
health ofhuman beings. That is to say, such wastes
could be judged "unacceptable" in either of two
ways: first, they are perceived to be so hazardous
and intractable that technological methods of dis-
posal must provide for, and indeed guarantee, both
their permanent containment and isolation from a
human environment for as long as they have poten-
tially adverse effects on human health; or secondly,
the risks associated with hazardous wastes are so
unacceptable that their technological sources must
be eliminated from a human environment without
regard to cost, social or financial.
To make either of these judgments in a manner
which is as ethically and socially responsible as can
humanly be expected, we are compelled by their
far-reaching consequences, as well as by our cur-
rent cultural situation, to give careful consideration
to the ethical problems that derive from three con-
troversial aspects of policy-making about public
safety: the appropriateness of using sophisticated,
scientifically-calculated risk analyses of experts
having unintended side-effects on public risk-
perception; the proper responsibility of scientific
experts, legislative bodies, and regulatory agencies
in shaping the process of policy-making for public
safety; the status ofpublic education concerning the
risks and hazards that allegedly threaten ourquality
of life in a high technology society.
All too frequently and uncritically, many people
assume that the "'safety" of any human artifact or
process is an intrinsic property that can be mea-
sured by the reduction (or even absence) of risks.
The difficulty underlying this assumption is com-
plex, both philosophically and technically. There is
little disagreement about saying, "A thing is safe if
its risks areJudged to be acceptable," or in defining
risk as "a measure ofthe probability and severity of
harm to human health" (1). The difficulty takes root
in the fact that risk-measurement-however objec-
tive and scientific-is nonetheless probabilistic.
The ordinary citizen is neither trained nor accus-
tomed to thinking in probabilistic terms, rather, he/
she thinks in what Philip Pahner calls a mixed
"'rational-intuitive manner," greatly influenced by a
threshold of awareness or perception anchored in
subconscious images of horrifying events (2). In-
deed, when probabilities are given numerical quan-
tifications and indexes (e.g., one in a million) anx-
ieties are not appeased but magnified. Another
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about the acceptability of risks, or safety judg-
ments, are derived from subjective, shifting,
evolving personal and social value priorities.
Measuring risks does not automatically entailjudg-
ing safety. These are two distinct cognitive activ-
ities, qualitatively different from each other. Here
lies the root ofpublic misconceptions, disputes, and
false expectations about the ability of scientific ex-
perts to "measure safety." It is risks that are
measurable, quantifiable, predictable, whereas
safety is an immeasurable, relativistic value judg-
ment. Failure to recognize two basically different
activities at work in policy-making for public safety
has had a number of unfortunate consequences.
In the first place, on the assumption that ever
more exhaustive knowledge of actual and potential
risks associated with a product or process, in this
case "solid wastes," will automatically yield
greater degrees ofsafety, enormous sums ofmoney
and hours of human effort have been poured into
risk analysis. Every conceivable category in the
anatomy of risk seems to have been exhaustively
addressed, namely: psychological research into
factors influencing or determining public risk-
perception; multiple types of risk-analysis ex-
pressed in probabilistic quantifications and ex-
trapolations into "maximum credible accident" and
"worst case" scenarios; studies about units and
costs of risk-reduction either of the consequences
orofthe frequency ofan incidence; cost/risk/benefit
quantifications designed as an instrument for
decision-analysis; acceptable-risk criteria designed
to conform to public perceptions about risks to
present and future generations.
Despite its good intentions, purposes, and prom-
ises, risk-analysis has been applied unfortunately
within traditional institutional frameworks in ways
that force risk-assessments to be piecemeal, ad hoc,
haphazard, isolated forone-at-a-time consideration.
In the public domain, one hazard is spotlighted for a
time, giving way to another in unending succession:
DDT, lead, cyclamates, the Pill, red dye #2, PCBs
and PCVs and PBBs, now saccharin.
Moreover, each regulatory agency has its own
mandate to control one category of hazards on
which to conduct ongoing research, at the same
time making a case for more federal funds to do
more research in further risk reduction. Not only
does piecemeal, selective concentration magnify
certain hazards at the data-gathering and risk-
analysis levels, but the public is led to believe that
the more studied risks are by that very fact the more
dangerous to public health and safety. But this is
clearly not the case.
Radiation control programs are an apt illustra-
tion. The BEIR Committee has recognized the pos-
sibility that cost/risk/benefit analyses-if truncated
or inadequately conducted-might single out some
biohazards for regulation, and in so doing, actually
set up conditions for a decrease in public health.
This admonition is stated in this way: ". . . the
public must be protected from radiation but not to
the extent that the degree of protection provided
results in the substitution ofa worse hazard for the
radiation avoided. Additionally, there should not be
attempted the reduction of small risks even further
at the cost of large sums of money, which spent
otherwise, would clearly produce greater benefit"
(3).
The Environmental Protection Agency seems to
have disregarded this caution when applying its
great zeal to implement the upper limit, zero-
threshold, linear-dose model which the BEIR report
proposed simply as a recommendation. An EPA
regulation imposed on the uranium fuel cycle re-
quires that it contribute nothing in excess of 25
mrem/year to the exposure of any member of the
public. If radiation protection philosophy requires
regulatory agencies to set radiation standards that
safeguard the public from demonstrable, detectable
biomedical effects, then the upper limit of25 mrem
couldjust as well be 75 or 100 or more without any
greater probability of increasing noteworthy, de-
tectable adverse effects. Moreover, it has often
been pointed out that this regulation is much more
stringent than radiation levels ignored, or at least
tolerated, by EPA regulators in several other
technology-induced sources. The 25 mrem ceiling
per year is: "afactorof20 less than the 500 millirem
per year measured in the Grand Central Station in
New York City; a factor of 20 less than the 500
millirem per yearofcosmic radiation received by an
airline stewardess who spends 20 hours per week at
high altitude; a factor of4 less than the 100 millirem
geographical difference in natural background radi-
ation between Denver, Colorado, and New Haven,
Connecticut; a factor of more than 1000 below the
lowest dose rate at which any harmful effects have
been observed on eitherpeople or test animals" (4).
There is no evidence that any member ofthe pub-
lic has suffered injury or death from the uranium
fuel cycle. By contrast, routine medical x-rays, ac-
cording to one conservative estimate, exact a
cancer toll of 2700 deaths per year. By any com-
monsense standards ofcomparable-hazard analysis,
public concern over uranium fissioning and expen-
ditures of huge sums of money to reduce already
negligible risks even further have been magnified
out of all due proportion.
By selecting certain risks for piecemeal public
consideration, and failing to represent comparable
Environmental Health Perspectives 226or greater risks as a contextual frame of reference
for balanced consideration, responsible legislators
and regulators-and their scientific consultants-
are systematically excluding ethical priorities in
providing protection to public health and safety.
It may seem amusing to suggest that something in
this nation has not yet been counted, but we have
some urgent undone business here. What we really
need is a whole new field of numbers. We need to
know, with the most comprehensive overview, how
much public money is spent to reduce ordinary dis-
eases and accidents and hazards that afflict major
segments of the population, the cost per capita to
reduce them, and precisely at what point vast
amounts ofmoney may be pouring into budgets that
can assure only minor gains in the status of public
health. We have a surfeit of statistics on public
health, but those data are not arranged by any re-
sponsible public institution so as to look at risks to
the entire population relatively, to make compari-
sons, to maximize cost-effectiveness so as to get the
most public health for the many out ofthe expendi-
ture of public money. Comparable risk-analysis is
talked about, but it is not acted on or used responsi-
bly at a comprehensive level by those state and fed-
eral agencies empowered to do it.
Ethics cannot do the data-gathering and risk mea-
surement which are minimal and indispensable to
making value judgments. Ethics can only examine
andjustify a set ofpriorities, based on some funda-
mental principles. We find such a set ofprinciples at
work in this statement by Cohen (5). "In limiting
the release ofharmful materials to the environment,
therefore, a balance or trade-offmust be determined
between expenditure and degree of restriction of
release, the objective being to maximize the effec-
tive use of financial resources. . . . It should be
noted that in expenditures to reduce a particular
hazard [whether carcinogens, radiation, urban or
industrial pollutants etc.] at some given cost (C),
the return per unit expenditure decreases qs the
total expenditure increases. It may also be noted
that no matter how much money is expended, a
further reduction could be attained by additional
spending. Beyond a certain point, however, money
might be more efficiently spent to reduce a different
hazard where the benefit per unit of investment
would be greater. This point would be at the inter-
section of the cost-effectiveness guideline and the
diminishing returns curve."
Since safety is a value judgment based on per-
sonal and social priorities, then it becomes sensible
to say that-when cost/risk/benefit ratios make it
clear that a point of diminishing returns on invest-
ment of time and public money has been
reached-then the particular product or process
under scrutiny is "'safe enough."
Such reasoning is objectionable to some persons,
however, again because of the failure to recognize
two different cognitive activities at work in safety-
policy making. Critics attack the methodology of
cost/risk/benefit quantifications for the absurdity of
"putting a price on human life" or "'giving a finite
monetary value to a being that is infinitely valu-
able." They see it as a case of "'measuring the im-
measurable." They do not recognize the distinction
between two discrete activities involved in making
safetyjudgments. Those who defend the methodol-
ogy have sometimes used simple observations, such
as "'There are necessary tradeoffs in any public
policy decision," or "'Everyone puts a finite,
monetary value on one's life when buying life insur-
ance, installing safety mechanisms in a home or
auto, taking hazardousjobs because they pay higher
wages." Such analogies are true enough, but not
sufficient. The public must be educated and con-
fronted with the fact that any society has but a finite
amount of money to spend on public health and
safety, and that the ethical problem is to get the
most protection for the most people from this finite
amount.
What is really at issue in this methodology is not
the propriety or impropriety ofputting some callous
"'dollar value" on human life or injury as a moral
judgment of individual worth, much less of using
economic losses to society as a measurement of
personal expendability. The point at issue is how
efficaciously we as a society are expressing the val-
uation we place on human life. The public should
have long since been confronted with a threefold
ethical justification for cost/risk/benefit quantifica-
tions, namely: we are in fact maximizing the value
we as a society place on human life when we en-
deavor to allocate public monies in such a way as to
reduce widespread hazards, thereby preventing as
much loss oflife and protection from injury as pos-
sible; by utilizing this method, we minimize arbi-
trary, piecemeal, isolated, selective decisions, and
instead aim at the most socially responsive and re-
sponsible process of decision-making about the
cost-effectiveness of finite resources and public
revenues; with this method we have visible and
verifiable standards forjudging the accountability of
elected or appointed officials in their allocation of
public monies in ajust and equitable manner.
Those responsible for making public policy in the
management of solid wastes have only begun to
wrestle with a basic ethical question. Have we in
fact maximized the value we place on human life if
we spend billions ofdollars to avoid lethal exposure
of a few persons to solid wastes, while the expen-
diture of public monies on preventing the death of
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crossings, dam failures, or inadequate health care
delivery to the elderly, the poor, the vulnerable per-
sons in our society is by comparison a matter for
national embarrassment? To be sure, we spend
more money per capita on medical care than any
other nation, but how trivial it seems by comparison
with the amount of public money expected to be
spent on managing solid wastes which, when con-
trasted with other greater risks to the public health
of the many, pose levels of risk approaching neg-
ligible proportions.
The quest for "safety" via sophisticated methods
ofrisk analysis has another unfortunate side effect,
namely, a widening discrepancy between the qual-
ity ofrisk-perception among scientific and technical
experts, and the quality of risk-perception induced
in the so-called "plain man" by various second- and
third-hand interpreters. Experts in psychological
research have sought to identify, not only the fac-
tors determining public risk-perception, but also
specific criteria that would have to be met to render
risks socially acceptable. By endeavoring to tailor
proposals for criteria that will conform to existing
levels of public perception, several experts in the
scientific and technical community are not engaged
in any studies of how to educate public risk-
perception, but instead how to capitulate to a set of
conditions wherein the public has grown steadily
out of touch with, and antipathetic toward, the
technical sophistication embodied in risk-analysis
of various scientific and technological advances.
As the gap ofmutual confidence and trust widens,
the scientific and technical community is being
drawn inescapably into the public and political
arena where it is reluctant to enter for two under-
standable reasons: qua scientist, the professional
expert feels committed to objectivity, distance, im-
munity from distorting biases; qua researcher, the
expert wants to exercise extreme caution, so as to
assure continued funding from financial sources
that are public and to minimize vulnerability to
charges of conflict of interest. However under-
standable, these reasons are no longer self-
justifying in our current cultural situation. By ab-
dicating a social responsibility to engage in effective
public education through the political process,
members ofthe scientific and technical community
are abandoning the field to special interest lobbies,
self-appointed social reformers, and ambitious
journalists.
Besides their own reluctance, members of the
scientific community have been offered other ex-
cusing reasons. Representatives ofthe legal and po-
litical community, such as Harold Green, have ar-
gued that scientists and technical experts are not
per se qualified to participate in public safety de-
terminations based on cost/risk/benefit methods of
evaluating drugs, industrial pollutants, and the like;
that the political process should not be made to
conform to scientific standards for objectivity, fac-
tual accuracy, and ""informed value judgments,"
and that since the goal of the political process of
policy-making is "the optimum resolution of con-
flict," the adversary process "may require the
symbolic acceptance of something as true which in
fact is untrue or only partly true" (6). In sum, delib-
erate distortions and factual errors are not only tol-
erable but inescapable in democratic policy-making,
including safety policy.
Quite apart from the questions of intellectual
honesty and professional ethics which this line of
argument raises, it does not constitute an ethical
justification which relieves members of the scien-
tific and technical community from their increasing
public responsibility to educate the citizens of a
democracy. Contrary to Harold Green, scientific
expertise and professional standards for factual ac-
curacy, as well as "informed valuejudgments," are
not an elitist substitution for a political decision-
making process, but an indispensable enrichment of
it as a condition for protecting the public interest.
The problem of public education in matters of
risk-measurement and safetyjudgments has steadily
acquired a special urgency. For a decade, we have
been living in a cultural climate dominated by what
is popularly called "the environmental crisis," "our
crisis of finitude," or "man's discovery of an
ecological conscience."
Without adoubt, we are the best informed society
in history. Consequently we are the most
forewarned, anxiety-prone, exhorted, and guilt-
ridden of cultures. This state of affairs is unprec-
edented forthree reasons: dire predictions are being
made, not simply by run-of-the-mill alarmists, but
by several "'authorities" or "experts" who appear
credible; their projected catastrophies are not local
or national but global; their credibility is enhanced
by the dramatic medium of mass communication,
and the public's insatiable thirst for bad news.
At least since Earth Day 1970, we have been in-
undated with allegedly hard evidence that the de-
terioration of the human species and our natural
environment is accelerating at an exponential rate,
and that our only habitable planet has been raped
and polluted by technological man, recklessly
driven on by rugged individualism and selfish greed
for profits. The damage inflicted seems to approach
eco-catastrophe. Rivers and streams have been
turned into sewers. Species of birds, animals, and
plants are supposed to be becoming extinct at a
rapidly increasing rate. Insecticides and weed
Environmental Health Perspectives 228poisons help to produce more food for starving
populations, but their toxic chemicals appear to
have found their way up the food chain to enter and
poison ourselves.
Technological interventions, pretending to be
"'solutions" to problems we had not thought
through adequately are indicted for being not only
insufficient but downright dangerous: it is advanced
technology in industry, agriculture and medicine
that has generated the environmental crisis in the
first place. Our high technology society is accused
ofhaving done more than any other to release toxic
chemicals and radiation sources into the environ-
ment. Allegedly, radioactive carcinogens have made
the preparation of food a lethal operation. Expert
environmentalists testify at congressional hearings
that even mother's milk is now poisoned. The world
has become dismally unsafe.
Permit me to suggest that this environmental-
crisis mentality, plus the broad social movement,
the federal legislation of 1969 (NEPA), and all the
regulatory machinery generated by it, constitute an
urgent problem about public education: namely,
how are we to recover and maintain some historical
and scientific perspective that will introduce a bal-
anced judgment about the alleged environmental
hazards posed by advanced technology? Many in-
sist that these biohazards have generated a self-
evident crisis. But no crisis is self-evident. There
are only recognized problems which have, in some
people's minds, assumed critical importance.
Among others, William Lowrance in OfAccepta-
ble Risk urges us not to succumb to historical am-
nesia. When certain environmentalists deplore the
degradation which "technological pollution" has in
their eyes wrought on this planet, he suggests that
we remember what life without it at the turn ofthe
century was really like: spoiled food, impure water,
boiling laundry kettles, the backyard lye pot; nutri-
tional deficiencies and poisoning from many
natural/organic vegetables. Rivers were so filthy
with raw sewage from human wastes that, accord-
ing to the saying ofthe times, bait died on the hook.
The major insecticide 75 years ago-sprayed on ev-
erything from apples to strawberries to grapes-was
not DDT, but lead arsenate or Paris green. Women
canned food with such preservatives as boric acid
and formaldehyde in high concentrations. Red food
coloring was not red dye #2, but lead chromate-a
horror to today's biochemist. Fatal diseases were
not leukemia or Hodgkins disease or subtle forms of
cancer. They were pneumonia, influenza, tuber-
culosis. Average life expectancy was 40-45 years,
and 13% of all infants died before their first birth-
day. Today, as some people worry about the disin-
fectant hexachlorophene in soap, why do they so
easily forget the harsh carbolic acid it has replaced
and the surgical operations it has made safer? Have
the risks and hazards to public health and safety
incre sed in fact, or only in our levels of percep-
tion? Lowrance puts the case well: "We now have
the luxury to worry about subtle hazards which at
one time, even if detected, would have been given
only low priority beside the muchgreaterhazards of
the day"(1).
Not for a moment am I suggesting that new
hazards do not exist or that we should abandon at-
tempts to control technology-induced risks to
health, to teach industries better habits of efficient
use of resources and of waste management, or to
insist that social costs should be internalized by in-
dustry so that consumers are not forced to pay for
what they disapprove of. But I am suggesting
strongly that those responsible for educating pres-
ent and future citizens of this globe, and those re-
sponsible for setting regulatory standards, must
meet ethical priorities for maximizing public health
for the many-that is, for the working classes, the
poor, the elderly, the vulnerable persons in our
society-and not the vocal minority.
Let us not lose sight of the fact that the ecology
movement flourishes only in affluent nations, and
only among groups of persons whose socio-
economic level and quality of life have guaranteed
that basic subsistence and security needs have been
abundantly met-usually by parents, or a network
of charitable or self-appointed public interest or-
ganizations. Among those who find the concepts
"small is beautiful" and "soft technology" most
appealing, how many ofthem actually live in condi-
tions where these concepts exist as concrete
realities? It is less than wise to select long-term
public policies based on predilections ofthose who
are still in an impressionable stage, or who have yet
to meet the demands of making a living, or who
have not actually lived within an entire social sys-
tem made to conform to what they are recom-
mending.
George T. Lock Land, author of Grow or Die:
The Unifying Principle of Transformation, has this
to say about environmentalist priorities (7):
"Even the most calculated over-dramatization of
future environmental horrors has not yet begun to ap-
proach the realities of a world in which most people
live without the 'malevolence' of man's evolutionary
technology.
Frenzied alarm over 'ecocide' generates an insidious
camouflage that hides the truly apocalyptic human
suffering oftoday. Pollution? Eight often humans lack
sanitary disposal and seven of ten still are without an
adequate supply of safe water. Waste of resources?
Over halfof the human race lives with hunger, which
drains energy and stunts body and mind....
Rebalancing the books of disease, starvation and
December 1978 229misery is our mission, not protecting nature's balance
and its extravagant claims on the suffering of the
human race."
The burden of responsibility to educate ordinary
citizens in the art of evaluating risk-potentials and
reaching a consensus on reasonable levels ofsafety
cannot be carried principally, much less alone, by
academicians from nonscientific disciplines. We
share a common social problem of effective public
education. If it does not receive major attention
soon, we shall most assuredly be depriving our-
selves of resources and scientific advances that are
unequivocally essential for the preservation and on-
going improvement of the quality of public health
and safety for the many.
We can and shall continue to devise technical
solutions to the management of solid wastes and
other threats to the quality ofour physical environ-
ment. If only we could manage to balance our ex-
cessive concern and expenditure ofpublic money to
reduce risks from various pollutants (or excessive
concern for endangered species of plants and ani-
mals), with a concern to reduce the risks we are
bequeathing to future generations from the un-
solved problems ofstarvation, poverty, racism, and
social inequities-then ourlegacy would indeed be a
spiritually gratifying benefit for our common hu-
manity.
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